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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

THE STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
DAVID M. ESTES,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

SUPREME COURT NO. 35767

1
Defendant-Appellant.

CLERK'S RECORD

Appeal from the District Court of the Second Judicial District
of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Nez Perce

BEFORE THE HONORABLE CARL B. KERRICK, DISTRICT JUDGE

Counsel for Respondent

Counsel for Appellant

Mr. Lawrence G. Wasden
Attorney General
Post Office Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010

Mr. David M. Estes
Pro-se
1308 loth Avenue
Lewiston, ID 83501

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
THE STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)

Plaintiff-Respondent,

)
i

i
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

V.

DAVID M. ESTES,
Defendant-Appellant.
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IN THE NEZ PERCE COUNTY SECOND JUDlC
IN AND FOR THE STATE OF I
County of NEZ PERCE
Plaintiff IRespondent,

v,
David M. Estes,

) Cause NO: CR-2007-0008507
)
) Motion for DisqualificationWithout Cause

1

l~omes
now the defendant, David M Estes, and moves to disqualify the Honorable Greg
/~albfleisch.
pursuant to Idaho Rule of Court CR25 (a).

/ ~ a t ethis
d ~8~~day of November 2007

__%7sqALer&2
C

David M. Estes, Defendant

Motion for Disqualification - 1

David M. Estes
1308 1om AV.
LEWISTON. ID
208.746.1744

DANIEL L. SPICKLER
Nez Perce County Prosecuting
Erik L. Johnson
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
Post Office Box 1267
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
Telephone: (208) 799-3073
I.S.B.N. 5995

I N THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, I N AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE

STATE OF IDAHO,

CASE NO. CR2007-0008507
Plaintiff,
MOTION REQUESTING ADDITIONAL
TIME TO FILE DISCOVERY

vs.
DAVID M. ESTES,
Respondent.

I

COMES NOW, Erik L. Johnson, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney for Nez
Perce County, State of Idaho, and moves the above-entitled Court for an
order granting an additional fourteen (14) days t o provide t h e Defendant
with supplemental discovery.
This motion is based upon the grounds that the Defendant has
requested information i n his discovery request t h a t is not readily attainable
by the State.

Additional time is necessary t o obtain said information t o

provide t o t h e Defendant.
DATED this

MOTION

%4'-

day o f November, 200

AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE
I declare under penalty of perjury t h a t a full, true, complete and
correct copy o f the foregoing MOTION REQUESTING ADDITIONAL TIME TO
FILE DISCOVERY was

(1) -hand delivered, o r
(2) -hand delivered via court basket, o r

(3) -sent via facsimile, or
(4) &mailed,
postage prepaid, by depositing the same in the
United States Mail.

ADDRESSED TO THE FOLLOWING:
David Estes
1308 lothAvenue
Lewiston, I D 83501
DATED this

MOTION

&

day of November, 200Z.

A

IN THE DISTRICT COURT
STATE OF IDAHO, IN

DISTRICT OF THE
OF NEZ PERCE

STATE OF IDAHO,

e No. CR07-8507

Plaintiff,

1
1
1

v.

DAVID M. ESTES,

ORDER REGARDING
DISQUALIFICATION OF
MAGISTRATE JUDGE

)

Defendant.

The undersigned Magistrate Judge deems himself disqualified to preside over this case.
Plaintiff
Defendant has moved to disqualify the undersigned Magistrate Judge
pursuant to I.R.C.P. 40.
The Motion is - granted

denied.

X
Defendant has moved to disquaiifjr the under-signed Magistrate Judge
State
pursuant to I.C.R. 25.
The Motion is

Order Regarding Disqualification
of Magistrate Judge

4 granted

denied.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on this
foregoing was:

&day,-of --Eumba//2007, a true and correct copy ofthe

Hand delivered

1
I

Mailed
Sent Valley Messenger

Erik L. Johnson
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
P.O. Box 1267
Lewiston, ID 83501

Order Regarding Disqualification
of Magistrate Judge

David M. Bstes
(Wl6U.i
Pro Se
1308 lothAvenue
Lewiston, ID 83501

J)

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
STATE OF IDAHO,

CASE NO. CR 07-8507

)

1

Plaintiff,

ST$~&D

)

ORDER APPOINTING

VS.

1

DAVID M. ESTESS,

1
Defendant.
)

The Honorable Greg K. Kalbfleisch, having been disqualified pursuant to Idaho Criminal
Rule 25, the Honorable Jay P. Gaskill, with chambers in Nez Perce County, is hereby appointed
to preside in this action.
DATED this

day of December 2007.

%
STEVEN CAYL
Trial Court Admingkator

Certificate of Mailing

1hereby certify that on this
was delivered to the following:

k

U. S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
---Valley Messenger Service
Hand Delivery
Facsimile

-

day of December, 2007, a true copy of the foregoing

-

U. S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Valley Messenger Service
Hand Delivery
Facsimile

County Prosecutor's Office
P.O. Box 1267
Lewiston, ID 83501

David Estess
1308 10" Avenue
Lewiston, ID 83501

Telefax to Judge assigned to this case

PATTY 0.WEEKS, Clerk of th6$%w*

#

DEPUTY

ORDER APPOINTTNG JUDGE

7

I

I N THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNW OF NEZ PERCE

I

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,

CASE NO. CR2007-0008507

ORDER ALLOWING ADDITIONAL TIME
TO FILE DISCOVERY

vs.

I

DAVID M. ESTES,
Respondent.

Based upon t h e State's Motion and good cause appearing therefore,
I T I S HEREBY ORDERED that the State is granted an additional fourteen (14)
days t o file supplemental discovery.
DATED this

ORDER

\>aay

of December, 2007.

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
Ihereby certify t h a t a true and correct copy o f the foregoing, MOTION
REQUESTING ADDITIONAL TIME TO FILE DISCOVERY, was
(1)-hand delivered, or

(2)
(3)

v'hand delivered via court basket, o r
sent via facsimile, o r

/mailed,
postage prepaid, by depositing t h e same in United States
(4) mail, addressed t o the following:
David Estes
1308 loth Avenue
Lewiston, I D 83501
Prosecutor's OfRce
P. 0. Box 1267
Lewiston, I D 83501

CLERK OF THE COURT

Deputy

ORDER

FILED
4
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6
IN THE NEZ PERCE COUNTY SECOND
IN AND FOR THE STAT

7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18

County of NEZ PERCE
Plaintiff IRespondent,

1

v,

) Motion to Dismiss
)

1

David M. Estes,
Defendant I Appellant

I/

19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40

+,%

) Cause NO: CR-2007-0008507

Comes now the defendant, David M. Estes, and moves for a dismissal of the charges pending
before the court in this cause. This motion is based on the following:

I.Facts

1.1. On 1112012007 the defendant submitted a request for production of documents. That
request included a copy of the officers training records that show he was trained on the type of

/1

radar used, a copy of the FCC license issued to the State of Idaho to operate radar units, and ;
copy of the officer's log on the day of the alleged infraction.

1.2. The plaintiff submitted a request for an extension of time to gather the material and was
granted a fourteen day extension. To date the aforementioned documents were not produced.
I!. Authority
2.1. This motion is brought pursuant to ICR 16 (e)(2).
Dated this 31'' day of December 2007

?&$z

g9TG

David M. Estes. Defendant

46
47
48
49
50

Motion to dismiss - 1

David M. Estes
1308 1 om AV.
LRNISTON, ID
208.746.1744

1

IN TEE DIST
STATE

CASE TITLE
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CLERK
E
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NO.

-'RICT OF THE

hZ"i&
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No-

DEE ATTORNEYYLCASE
OTIIERS PRESENT

T
\

DATE
TIME

EE I T KXOW TgAT rCHe FOLLQWIHG PROCEEDINGS WERE W , TO WITl

-

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDWO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE

CASE TITLE

State of Idaho
v.
David Estes

JUDGE

Jay P. Gaskill

HEARING TYPE

Court Trial

CLERK

Donna Evans

PLTF ATTORNEY Erik Johnson

TAPE NO.

T-5505

DEF A?TORNEY

CASE NO.

CR-2007-8507

TIME

1O:OO AM

Pro Se

March 31d,2008

IT KNOWN THAT THE FOLLOWING PROCEEDINGS WERE HAD, TO WIT:

\/' Erik Johnson present for State
/

David Estes present Pro Se
#I387 State calls John Fems
Sworn in
#I405 State begins direct exam
#I570 Defendant objects re: Lidar
#I606 Pause in tape while State looks at information provided to defendant
#I621 State addresses court
#I625 State ~uestionswitness re: tWe of radar used at traffic stop
#I696 State did provide defendant with the wrong. info. on the type of radar used
#I708 Defendant makes a motion to dismiss
State asks to proceed without radar testimony
Court excludes any evidence re: radar
#I725 State continues with direct exam of Fems
#I763 State ends
#I779 Defendant begins cross exam of Ferris
#2292 Defendant ends
#2296 State bepins recross

-Witness

---s

steps down

State has no other witnesses

Court finds defendant ~uiltv

Fine and court costs total $75.00 and are due by 04-03-2008
Recess

Sp-or ludicial District Court, State of idah
li.n
.d For the County of Nez Perc
1230 Main St.
Lewiston, ldaho 83501
STATE OF IDAHO
Plaintiff,
vs.

)

David M Estes
1308 10th Ave
Lewiston, ID 83501

)
)

Defendant.
DOB:
DL or SSN:

FIE@r

)

Case No: CR-2007

)
)
)

INFRACTION
DEFERRED PAYMENT AGREEMENT

1
)
)

JUDGMENT HAVING
penalty or fine and court
payment;

r the charge against the above named defendant and for the
d the defendant having shown good cause for a deferred

IT IS HEREBY AGREED that the defendant is granted a deferred payment agreement as follows: Defendant
agrees t o pay by April 3rd, 2008.
You are further advised that an additional statutory
payment.

fee will be assessed for EACI-( partial

THIS CHARGE IS AN INFRACTION- YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED that if you do not pay said penalty
within the time agreed, in person or by mail to the Court, your DRIVER'S LICENSE WlLL BE SUSPENDED by
the ldaho Transportation Department or your home state pursuant to the interstate Nonresident Violator
Compact.

f i

If you cannot make the
why Your license

before the court to show cause

Patty 0. Weeks

FINES NOT PAiD By DUE
DATE WlbL BE TURNED

BY:

R E ~ TB
g gCPLLECT~QN.
~

I acknowledge receipt of this agreement and state that I have read and agreed to this terms of the agreement
and acknowledge that I realize that MY DRIVER'S LICENSE WlLL BE SUSPENDED IF I FAIL TO MAKE
PAYMENTS AS AGREED.Defendant
Infraction Deferred Payment Agreement

fl

DOC06 12/92

IDAHO UNIFORM CITATION
COURT DOCKET
DATE

o

Fixed fine paid by mail

-

o Defendant appeared --first appearance
o

Entered plea of admission or guilty
o Infraction: Plea of admission
o Misdemeanor: I plead guilty to the offense:
Paid fixed penalty or fine
W " I
o Sentenced by Court
Advised of rights, entered plea of denial or not guilty
o Trial set for
o Jury o Jury Waived o Jury NIA
Bail set in amount $
(misdemeanor only)
Continued until
Warrant issued -- Reason:
Default - failed to appear on infraction
Other action:
S e c o n d Judicial District Court, State of Idaho
In a n d F o r the C o u n t y of Nez Perce
o

o
o
o
o
o
o

"

) JUDGMENT (VIOLATION #I)
) Case No: CR-2007-0008507
)

T h e S t a t e o f I d a h o , Plaintiff,

vs.

David M E s t e s

The defendant having been fully advised of his constitutional and statutoiy rights, including his right to be represented
by counsel, and the defendant having:
o Been advised of right to court appointed counsel if indigent
o Been represented by counsel
o Waived counsel
(name)
o Entered a plea of admission or guilty
Entered a plea of denial or not guiity, and has been
$(~ound to have committed the offense
o Found not to have committed the offense
o Failed to appear on an infraction -- default entered
NOW THEREFORE, Judgment is hereby entered:
Against the defendant
(days) (months)
a Defendant's driving privileges are suspended for
o For the defendant
o Withheld judgment (misdemeanor only)
For the charge of the offense of in violation o f section 149-654(2) Speed-exceed M a x i m u m Speed Limit on
Citation No. 1302770 C o u n t 1
REBY ORDERED, to pay the following fixed penalty or fine:
THE DEFENDANT IS
Penalty or fine

r

STATE OF IDAHO
COUNTY OF NEZPERCE
The undersigned Clerk of the above entitled court hereby certifies that

JUDGMENT

15.

/

7
IN THE NEZ PERCE COUNTY SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
8
IN AND FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO
9
10
) Appellate NO:
11 State of Idaho
12
Plaintiff IRespondent,
)
v,
) Cause NO: CR-2007-0008507
13
14
)
15 David M. Estes,
) Notice of Appeal
1
16
Defendant IAppellant
17
18 /TO: The clerk of Court Nez Perce County

1

20

I
1

AND TO: Erik L. Johnson, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney Nez Perce County Idaho

22 To you and each of you take note that the defendant, David M. Estes, files this notice of
21/
23
24 appeal from the Magistrate Division of the Nez Perce County court.
25
I.Title of Action

281 !
29

1.1. State of ldaho v. David M. Estes

II. Title of the Court
32
33
34
35
36
37

2.1. The trial was held in the Magistrate Division of the Nez Perce County Court Judge
Jay P. Gaskill presiding

Ill. Number Assigned

I

398 ~3.1. The number assigned to the action is CR-2007-0008507
3
IV. Appellate Court
42
43
44
46
47
48
49
50

4.1. This appeal is taken to the District Court of the Second Judicial District of the State

Notice of Appeal - 1

NOTICE OF APPEAL

David M. Estes
1308 loTHAV.
LEWISTON, ID
208.746.1744

$.I.
Cont'd ) Of Idaho, In and for the County of Nez Perce.
V. Judgment

I.
The judgment was dated March 3"', 2008. No separate judgment order was issued only a
?ferredpayment agreement which has the aforementioned date in it.
VI. Statement of lssues
1. This appeal is taken on matters of fact and law

VII. Statement on Recording
.IThe
. proceedings were recorded on a voice device only. There was no tape recording or

~ rreporter,
t
VIII. Issues on Appeal
.I. The following issues will be addressed on appeal:

a. Does Visual Estimation of Speed meet the Daubert test?
b. Does the State of Idaho have to have a criteria for visual estimation of speed?
c. Did the court's failure to dismiss the allegations after the first time that the prosecutor
failed to provide discovery violate public policy that infractions and the adjudication
of these infractions be just, speedy and inexpensive.
lated this lo* day of March 2008.

$.2#L!3< 0 / y

/ ..., c.F
, ,&.,7i &

2,
"

David M. Estes, Defendant

lotice of Appeal - 2

David M. Estes
1308 1ow AV.
LEWISTON, ID
208.746.1744

FILED
P A W 9.WEEKS

TKEhPl""

-."-

-A

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, I N AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ I'ERCE

1

STATE OF IDAHO,

Case No. Cr07-08507

)
)

Plaintiff,

1
1

VS.

ORDER ASSIGNING JUDGE

)

1

DAVID M. ESTES,
Defendant.

)

It is ORDERED that Judge Carl B. Kerrick, whose chambers are located in
Lewiston, Idaho, is assigned to preside over all further proceedings in the above-entitled
matter.

P- of March, 2008.
DATED this Bday

Carl B. Kerrick
Administrative District Judge

-

ORDER ASSIGNING JUDGE,
CIRnCR A C C T c ' h T T K T C

\
,

T T T n C E -1

Ib 8

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I do hereby cerfxfy that a full, true, complete
and correct copy of the foregoing
ORDER ASSIGNING JUDGE was mailed to:
Erik Johnson- messenger
David Estes
1308 lothAve
Lewiston ID 83501
Hon. Carl B. Kerrick

ORDER ASSIGNING JUDGE ,,, .,
DRnCR A C C T C W T X T C

TT TnCC

-3

ji g

FILED
@PUTY

.-

IN TI* DISTRICT COURT OF TKE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
)

1
1
1
1

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
)

DAVID M. ESTES,

CASE NO.CR07-08507
ORDER DETERMINING
METHOD OF APPEAL

Pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rules Rule 54, the Court makes the following
determination of method of appeal;
1) This appeal involves questions of hct and questions orlaw;
2) Said appeal should not be heard as a Trial de Novo;

3) A transcript of the proceedings before the Magistrate's Division is required for the
proceeding of this appeal;
4) The appellant shall contact a court reporter and pay an estimate ofthe transcript
costs within 14 days from the date of this Order; and
ORDER DETERMINNG METHOD OFAPPEAL
UL,

26

5) Upon payment of the estimated transcript fees, the transcriber shall prepare a
transcript as provided in Rule 54.
6) Upon lodging of the transcript, the Court shall determine the dates for filing of
appellants and Respondents briefs and arguments.

la-

DATED this /8 day of March, 2008.
/

0
CARL B. KERRICK - District Judge

CERTEICATE OF MAILING
THOD OF APPEAL
I hereby certify that a true copy of the foregoing ORDER DETERMWPNG
was mailed, postage prepaid, by the undersigned at Lewiston, Idaho, this B a y ofMarch, 2008,
on:
Erik Johnson 4.w
Deputy Prosecutor
P 0 Box 896
Lewiston ID 83501
David Estes
1308 10" Ave
Lewiston ID 83501

ORDER D E T E R M I N I N G
METHOD O F APPEAL

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL. DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintifmespondent,
VS.

DAVID M. ESTES,
DefendantIAppellant,

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

CASE NO. CR07-08507
ORDER SCHEDULING BRDEFS
AND ARGUMENT

Pursuant to this Court's order, a transcript of the proceedings in the Magistrates'
Division has now been lodged with this Court.
THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1) DefendantIAppellant shall file his brief on or before May 15,2008;
2) PlaintifflRespondent shall file their brief on or before June 12,2008;

ORDER SCHEDULING B R I E F S
AND ARGUMENT

3) DefendanUAppellant shall file his reply brief by July 3,2008;
4) Oral argument shall take place before the above-entitled Court in the Courtroom

of the Nez Perce County Courthouse on July 22,2008, commencing at 11:00 a.m..
DATED this *day

of April, 2008.

-.

CARL B. KERRICK - District Judge
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that a true copy of the foregoing ORDER SCHEDULING BRlEF
ARGUMENT was mailed, postage prepaid, by the undersigned at Lewiston, Idaho, this day of
April, 2008, on:

WND

Erik Johnson
Deputy Prosecutor
P 0 Box 896
Lewiston ID 83501
David Estes
1308 10" ~ v e
Lewiston ID 83501

ORDER SCHEDULING B R I E F S
AND ARGUMENT

IN THE NEZ PERCE COUNTY SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
IN AND FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO

) Cause NO: CR-2007-0008507
)
) Motion to Augment Record on Appeal
)
)

County of NEZ PERCE
Plainti IRespondent,

v,
David M. Estes,
Defendant 1 Appellant

l ~ o m e snow the defendant, David M. Estes, and moves the court for an order to augment the
/appellate record from the Magistrate Court to the District Coufi.
This motion is based on the following:
I. Facts

1.I.
On March 10" 2008, the defendant filed an appeal from the magistrate division to the
district court. As part of that appeal, the defendant moves the court to allow the record to be
supplemented with certain pleadings in addition to the trial transcript.

II. Argument
2.1 The defendant is asking for the record to be augmented with three pleadings all of which
are necessary to complete the defendant's appeal in this case. The three documents are a cou
order allowing the plaintiff an extension of time, motion to dismiss which was denied by
the court and an order continuing the case. These documents are needed to show that the
court improperly continued the trial instead of dismissing the complaint. ( See exhibits I, ll and
111.)

Motion to Augment Record - 1

David M. Estes
1308 1om AV.
LEWISTON, ID

208.746.1744

Sr

,?dJudicial District Court, State o f 16-50
. A and For the County of Nez Perci

. i.. .>
1230 Main St.
. . Lewiston, Idaho 83501
. . . ..
:

~,.,. !,

,

:

'

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)

Plaintiff,

1

Case No: CR-2007-0008507

)

VS.

1

David M Estes,

)

Defendant.

NOTICE OF HEARING

)

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the above-entitled case is hereby set for:
Court Trial
Judge:

Monday, March 03,2008
Jay P. Gaskill

10:OO AM

a t the Nez Perce County Courthouse i n Lewiston, Idaho.

I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true and correct copy of this Notice of Hearing entered by the Court and
on file in this office. I further certify that copies of this Notice were served as follows on this date Monday,
December 31,2007.

Defendant:

David M Estes
1308 10th Ave
Lewiston, ID 83501
Mailed

Hand Delivered-

Mailed-

Hand Delivered-

Mailed-

Hand D e l i v e r e d 1

Private Counsel:

Prosecutor:

Erik L. Johnson

Dated: Monday. December 31. 2007
Patty 0. Weeks
Clerk Of The District Court

BY:

W N N A W&W
Deputy Clerk
DOC22 7/96

PATTY 0. WEEKS
CLERK OF THE DIST. COURT
5

DEPUTY

6

IN THE NEZ PERCE COUNTY SECOND
IN AND FOR THE STAT

7
8

!3$77!3?&!RT1

9

10
11

County of NEZ PERCE
Plaintiff 1 Respondent,

v,

12

13
14
15
16

) Cause NO: CR-2007-0008507

1
) Motion to Dismiss
)
)

David M. Estes,
Defendant IAppellant

Comes now the defendant, David M. Estes, and moves for a dismissal of the charges pending
before the court in this cause. This motion is based on the following:
I.Facts
/I
.I
On I lROROO7 the defendant submitted a request for production of documents. That

request included a copy of the officers training records that show he was trained on the type of

I

radar used, a copy of the FCC license issued to the State of Idaho to operate radar units, and a
copy of the officer's log on the day of the alleged infraction.

1.2. The plaintiff submitted a request for an extension of time to gather the material and was
granted a fourteen day extension. To date the aforementioned documents were not produced.

i

I

II. Authority

12.1. This motion is brought pursuant to ICR 16 (e)(2).
Dated this 31'' day of December 2007

_~-ee~~p~-~;;r~ft
David M. Estes, Defendant

David M. Estes
1308 1 ow AV.
LEWISTON.ID
208.746.1744

Motion to dismiss - 1

MOTION TO AUGMENT RECORD
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MOTION TO AUGMENT RECORD
I!
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
CASE NO. CR2007-0008507

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,

ORDER ALLOWING ADDITIONAL TIME
TO FILE DISCOVERY

VS.

DAVID M. ESTES,
Respondent.

Based upon the State's Motion and good cause appearing therefore,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the State is granted an additional fourteen (14)
days to file supplemental discovery.

DATED this

J b%ay

of December, 2007.

JAY P.GWS#!L%
JUDGE

O~!@KION
TO AUGMENT RECORD

-29

MOTION TO AUGMENT RECORD

20

Ill. Authority
1. This motion is based on Criminal Rule 54.1 1 and Appellate Rule 30.
IV. Relief Requested
1. The court is asked to allow the defendsnt to augment the record on appeal.

ated this 1 0 day
~ of April 2008.

-~-.p&zy-&d&EZL
David M. Estes, Defendant

lotion to Augment Record - 2

MOTION TO AUGMENT RECORD

David M. Estes
1308 1 om AV.
LEWISTON, ID
208.746.1744

FILED
I

I

m MY 15

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE S
THE STATE OF IDAHO IN AND

pfl 2 40

STATE OF IDAHO
PLAINTIFF I RESPONDENT

I

C&

67-09.507

DAVID M. ESTES
DEFENDLWT I APPELLANT

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
Appeal fkom the Magistrate Court of the Second Judicial Dislrict for Nez Perce County.
Honorable Jay Gaskill, Magistrate Judge, presiding.
David M. Estes, Appellant
Pro Se
1308 lothAv.
Lewiston Idaho 83501

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

Erik Johnson,
Nez Perce County
Prosecuting Attorney
1109 "F" St.
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is a trafic
intiaction case on appeal from the Magistrate Division of the Second Judicial
District in and for the County of Nez Perce. David M. Estes was cited on October 16&2007 by
State Trooper John Ferriss on Highway 95 outside Lewiston, Idaho, for speeding. Estes contested
the charge and demanded a bench trial.
The court assigned a trial date of November 20' 2007 which was changed due to an objection to
a judge who would preside. Dnring this transitional period where no judge was assigned, and in
response to a request for production of records by the defendant, David Estes, the Nez Perce
County Prosecuting Attorney's Office submitted a request for an extension of time to comply
with discovery. That motion was made on the 30' day of November by the Nez Perce County
Prosecutors Office represented by DPA Erik Johnson. That motion was granted on 12 December
2007 by the Honorable Jay Gaskill, Magistrate Judge for Nez Perce County. A trial date of
December 3 I", 2007 at 10:OO A.M. was set.

'

On December 31S', 2007, the defendant, David Estes, filed a motion to dismiss for failure to
provide discovery. The motion to dismiss was denied by Judge Gaskilt. Judge Gaskill ordered
that a new trial date of March 3'd 2008 be set and that all parties were to resolve all issues prior
to that date.
On March 3'd 2008, a bench trial was held before the Honorable Jay P. Gaskill, Magistrate Judge
for Nez Perce County. Immediately upon the opening testimony of the state's witness Trooper
John Ferriss, it was discovered that the Nez Perce County Prosecutor's Office had not supplied
the defendant with the proper information related to the radar unit. At that point a proper
objection was raised to the testimony pertaining to the radar unit. The court disallowed any
testimony pertaining to the radar. Prosecutor Johnson then proceeded to trail without the use of
any radar reading to support the testimony of Trooper Fenis.
The trial was held on the basis of the trooper's visual estimation of the defendant's speed.
Trooper Ferris testified that he was a twenty year veteran of the Idaho State Police. That he
underwent certification by sitting in a police vehicle and observing vehicles and estimating their
speed while an instructor kept a record of his estimations using a rsdar gun to verify his speed
estimations. Trooper Fems testified that he did not have any specific scientific knowledge of
visual estimation of speed nor had he personally studied the visual estimation of speed at any
college or other institution.
A judgment was rendered in favor of the State of Idaho. The defendant now appeals that
judgment. At issue is whether the state can convict solely on the visual estimation of speed made
by the citing officer and whether the court's failure to dismiss the complaint violated the public
policy that adjudication of idhctions be just speedy and inexpensive.
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ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
I. Did the court err by finding for the state based solely on the officer's visual estimation of
speed?

2. Did the court err by failing to dismiss the allegations after the first time that the prosecutor
failed to provide discovery and did that failure to dismiss violate public policy that adjudication
of infractions be just, speedy and inexpensive?
3. Is the appellant entitled to reasonable expenses?

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

.

I. ARGUMENT
1.1.

!Xp_Tm; COURT ERR BY FLNDlNG FOR_Tf-IE STm;BASED SOLE1,Y ON THE

OFFICER'S VISUAI, ESTUIKrION 01; SPEED ?
The State of Idaho in this case has proposed that the human eye can estimate speed s&cient to
establish liability. In order for the state to meet its burden, it must show that the particular claim
meets certain criteria That criteria can be defined as:
a. whether the theory has been or can be tested for validity.
b. whether the theory has been subjected to peer review or publication.
c. what the known or potential rate of error is when the theory is applied.
d. whether there are there are any maintenance of standank or whether standards exist.
e. whether the theory is accepted in the scientific cornunity and to what degree.
,

These standards are found in the case of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S.
579 (1993). The U.S. Supreme Court went on to say that the courts should consider the known or
potential rate of error of a theory, quoting Daubert in United States v. Smith, 869 F.2d. 348.
The State of Idaho in two cases states that the Daubert standards are not used but rely on Rules
of Evidence 702. That rules reads:

" If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert
by knowledge, skill, experience, training or education, may testify thereto in the form of
an opinion or otherwise."
In two Idaho cases the Idaho Supreme Court stated the policy of the court. The cases were
State v. Me&,

131 Idaho 642,962 P2d 1026 and Weeks v. Eastern Idaho Health Services,

143 Idaho 834. In Weeks the court stated, " The focus of the court's inquiry is on principles and
methodology not on the conclusions they generate." The court in these two cases went on to say
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that the foundation for admission of opinion testimony must be based upon scientific knowledge
and includes both that the witness is an expert in the field and that there is a scientific basis for
the experts opinion. Simply put, as in Prey-Daubert, the court is placed in the role of gatekeeper
to ensure that the expert opinion is both relevant and reliable.
Further the United States Supreme Court in Kumho T i e Co. v. Cannichael, 526 U.S. 137,
119 S.Ct 1167, 1174-1176 stated that the Daubert principals applied to both scier~tificand
technical opinion. In the Kumho case, the court disallowed the expert opinion testimony based
on the witness's methodology which is consistent with the Idaho approach in Weeks and
Merwin.
For a court to take judicial notice of a principal, the principal must be an accepted one in the
appropriate scientific community. Decisions that simply declare a device or scientific
methodology reliable without explanation is of little value. In State v. Williamson, 144 Idaho
597, 166 p.31d.387, the Idaho Supreme Court recognized that to take judicial note of a particular
theory or technical fact there must be a basis for the notice not just that someone else does it
or we just do it that way.
This brings us to the state's use of visual estimation of speed to determine the speed of a vehicle.
the state must show that there is some scientific basis or provable basis for claiming that the
visual estimation of speed technique is accurate and that the human eye can determine speed
simply by observation. The state cannot establish that there is a scientific study or any research
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that shows that the human eye can accurately determine speed. The appellant has asked the Idaho
State Police Academy for any such study or research done on the visual estimation of speed.
They have none. ( See exhibit I ) Visual estimation of speed cannot pass a Daubert, Frey, or
Evidence Rule 702 standard.
In State v. Garret, 119 Idaho 878, 81 1 P.2d. 488, the court made an interesting d i n g that is
germain to this case. Garret involved the use of an eye test call HGN to determine if a person
was intoxicated. The court held that the test was useful in determining intoxication but standing
alone the test was not sufficient to convict because it had no scientific evidence of reliability
However the test in conjunction with other observations could be used to convict a person of
intoxication. Here we find a similar situation. Visual Estimation of Speed has no scientific basis
and is used to assist officers in determining which vehicle is speeding or to assist in verifying a
radar reading. Absent a more accurate and scientific verifiable measure the visual estimation of
speed alone is not sufficient to convict. It certainly does not meet the standard of beyond a
reasonable doubt.
The visual estimation of speed depends upon a variety of factors, including distance, position,
length of observation, existence of reference points and experience of the witness in judging
speed. Trooper Ferriss in his testimony testified that the vehicle in question was 700 to 800 feet
away when he first saw it. He estimated the speed to be at 65 m.p.h. ( TR 7) Trooper Ferris did
not testify that he used any reference points. ( TR 17-18)When asked if the Trooper had any
training in visual estimation of speed he stated that he had been trained in the academy ( TR 6-7)
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and that he had been periodically tested through the years. ( TR 6-7)
On cross examination, Trooper Femss stated that his recertification consisted of sitting in the
back of a polide car with an instructor who used a radar to verify Trooper Ferriss' estimates.
( TR 18) Trooper Ferriss testified that he had no secondary !mining such as a college or school

that taught any theory of visual estimation of speed. ( TR 19 ) He could not have because none
exist.
Trooper Ferriss was placed in a police car in an area where the speed limit was known. Vehicles
would have observed the speed l i t generally. Since the speed limit was known it was very
easy to guess the speed of a vehicle by comparing the speed of vehicles in the area A more
accurate test would have been to take the trooper to an area where he did not know the speed
limit and test him for accuracy. Another test would have been at night with no street lights or
limited lighting. This was not done. The point is that the tests that the state relies on are highly
inaccurate and do not meet the requirements for opinion testimony under Evidence Rule 702 et

al.

1.2. DID THE COURT ERR BY FAILING TO DISMISS THE ALLEGATIONS AFTER THE
FIRST TIME THAT THE PROCESCUTOR FAKED TO PROVIDE DISCOVERY AND DID
THAT FAILURE TO DISMISS VIOLATE PUBLIC POLICY THAT THE ADJUDICATION
OF HFRACTIONS BE JUST SPEEDY AND INEXPENSIVE ?

Idaho has followed suit in decriminalizing traffic violations. Many states have changed the
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classification of traffic violations to civil offenses. This is to not clog the courts up with jury
trials or long drawn out contested proceedings when there are more pressing cases on the court
docket. Many states such as Washington State have even adopted Infraction Rules for Courts of
Limited Jurisdiction.
c
is stated quite well in a controlling case titled, State of Idaho
Idaho's policy on t r a ~ infractions
v. Bennion, 112 Idaho 32,730 P.2d.952. Bennion addressed the issues of whether the legislature
had made traffic infractions civil violations and whether a jury trial was required. The court in its

ruling on those issues stated in part:
"The legislature gave a number of indications that its intent was to impose a
non-criminal non-punitive sanction. Its labeling of hfhctions as "civil, " though
ineffective in light of Article 5, Section 1, is one indicator. A second is found in
the legislative statement of putpose of the ITIA, which articulated the intent, "to
remove jail sentences and jury trials &om all of the non-serious motor vehicle
offenses." Statement of Purpose, R.S. 7129, H.B. 343 (1981). A third is reflected
in the fact that if Bennion refuses to pay the fine, he will only be subject to having
his license suspended. I.C. section 49-3408. " Such a suspension is not punitive
but acts as a coercive measure in the nature of a civil sanction." Anton, Supra, 463
A.2d at 707. The Idaho legislature obviously did not view traac infr-actionsas
worthy of stigma or condemnation.
Basically the legislature wanted to keep it simple, reduce the cost of litigation and not clog up the
courts with minor traffic infractions. This policy of keeping it simple is found in Washington
State's Infraction Rules for Court of Limited Jurisdiction. ( IRW) Its rule 1.1 (b) reads:

" Purpose - These rules shall be construed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of every h h c t i o n case."
The Washington State Appellate Court in City of Kirkland, v. Ellis, 82 Wa. App. 819,
920 P.2d. 206 (1996) re-enforced that policy. A Washington State citizen like the present
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appellant was forced to go to the court house three times to defend against the MIC
citation.
The court held that requiring a citizen to repeatedly go to the courthouse to defend himself
violated Rule 1.1. (b).
In this case, the court granted an extension to the state. ( Motion Requesting Additional T i e

~ ) Even after the motion to extend time was granted,
to File Discovery dated November 3 0 2007
the state failed to comply with discovery resulting in a defendant's motion to dismiss ( Motion
to Dismiss dated December 3 ld 2007) The court denied the motion and set a new court date.
Finally after a second appearance by the defendant to defend against the ticket, it was discovered
again that the prosecution had failed to comply with discovery. ( TR 8-10)
It is implied in the legislative action that decriminalizing traffic offenses and declaring them civil
infractions is to ensure a speedy, just and inexpensive adjudication of W

c violations. This

claim is reinforced by the actions of the Idaho Supreme Court which drafted the law in the fust
place and gave it to the judicial committee for processing. ( See Justice Bistline's comments in
Bennion ) The courts needed some way to stop the log jam in the court system and viewed the
Traffic Infractions Act as a way of relieving that workload.

1.3. IS THE APPELLANT ENTITLED TO REASONABLE EXPENSES ?
The appellant has incurred expenses in preparing this brief such as printing costs and fees to
prepare the trial transcript. The appellant should be allowed reasonable fees if he prevails.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

42

11

11. CONCLUSION
2.1. Qe State of ldaho has allowed a theory into its jurisprudence which has no scientific basis

for its claims. The issue is the visual estimation of speed. There are no specific studies that
address the issue of the visual estimation of speed by police officers. Questions such as does the
officer use a stop watch to measure speed? Does the officer use points of reference to determine
speed? Does the officer use the speed of other vehicles relative to the offenders speed to
determine speed? Can a police officer determine speed at night when the vehicle is coming
directly at the officer with headlights on? None of these questions have been tested in the
scientific community. The visual estimation of speed fails the Frey Daubert test and the
standad of review set by the Idaho Supreme Court under Evidence Rule 702. For any court
to aczcpt the visual estimation of speed as the sole basis for finding for the state would mean that
any police officer could stand on the side of the road and observe any vehicle for speeding. That
officercould then charge the alleged offender based solely on his visual estimation of speed.
That is hardly a legitimate standard the courts would want to allow and certainly should not.
The visual estimation of speed is a tool to verify a speed measuring device not the main method
used to determine speed especially when there are more accurate and reliable ways to measure
speed.

2.2. In decriminalizing certain traffic offenses, the State of Idaho with the cooperation of its
Supreme Court established a system to adjudicate nteaffjc violations fairly, quickly and
inexpensively. It is not fair to require a citizen to repeatedly have to come to the Court House
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to defend against a traffic violation that is civil in nature. This defeats the purpose of making
traffic infraction civil in nature in order to conserve limited judicial resources. If the state fails to
observe court procedures established through the court rules then the court should dismiss the
charge. A citizen should not be penalized for the mistakes of the state prosecution by being
required to appear repeatedly at the court house.
The court should reverse the lower court's admission of testimony on the visual estimation of
speed and dismiss the judgment.
The court should dismiss the judgment because the prosecution failed to abide by the rules of
discovery and it puts an unfair burden on the appellant to continually appear to defend himself
through no fault of his own.
Dated this 14" Day of May 2008.

-----q'-~29--/1"1~21E&z:
David M. Estes, Appellant Pro Se
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Idaho State Po
Service since 1939
Colonet G. Jerry Russell

C.L."Butch" Otter

Director

Governor

April 28, 2008
David Estes
1308 10"' Avenue
Lewiston, Idaho 83501

RE:

PUBLIC RECORDS REQUEST

Dear Mr. Estes:
The Idaho State Police has received your request dated April 16,2008, for information under
Idaho's Public Writings Act.

REQUEST: Regarding officer training information. Request cc of any training criteria for
officers in visual estimation of speed; scientific research to support state's assertion that an
officer can visually estimate the speed of a vehicle; any research done to support training of
officers on visual estimation of speed; any rules that require an officer to certify on use of speed
ineasuring devices.
'

RESPONSE: After consultation with the attorney for the Idaho State Police, your request is
partially denied as this is a record that Idaho State Police does not compile or maintain the
information requested, pursuant to IDAHO
CODE3 9-337(13).
You have a right to appeal this denial of your request by filing a petition in conformance with the
pl.ovisions of the Idaho Public Writings Act, Idaho Code 5 9-343. Your petition must be filed in
the Fourth Judicial District Couit of Idaho within one hundred eighty (180) calendar days of the
mailing of this response.
Sincerely,

K. 'Ann Cronin
Special Assistant
I
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EQUAL OPPORTUNITY EMPLOYER

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECON
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE
:ounty of NEZ PERCE
Plaintiff IRespondent,

) Cause NO: CR-2007-0008507

1

v,

) Motion to Stay Judgment

1
1

lavid M. Estes,

;omes now the defendant, David M. Estes, and moves the court for an order to Stay the
udgment in this case.
'his motion is based on the following:

I. Facts
.IOn
. March 10" 2008, the defendant filed an appeal from the magistrate division to the
listrict court. There has been a hearing date set for June of 2008 for oral argument. The
~riefof the appellant has been filed and sewed,
1.2. A payment schedule was signed giving the appellant until 3 April 2008 to pay the
udgment. The appellant appealed the decision but in reading the transcript it appears the
:ourt wants a separate motion to stay the judgment. That is the purpose of this motion.
11. Argument

!.I
The appellant has appealed the judgment in this case. In all likelihood he will prevail at the
3ppeals level. It makes no sense to impose judgment then have to return any monies paid to
:he court.

blotion to Stay Judgment - 1

David M. Estes
1308 IoTHAV.
LRNISTON, ID
208.746.1 744

Ill. Authority
1. This motion is based on Criminal Rule 54.5.

IV. Relief Requested
1. The court is asked to stay the judgment in this case pending the outcome of an appeal.

3ted this 15" day of May 2008.
/
---&c-~-M-<-&LK~~:

David M. Estes, Defendant

lotion to Stay Judgment - 2

David M. Estes
1308 1 om AV.

LEWISTON.ID
208.746.1744

FILED

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, LN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)

Plaintiff,

1
1

CASE NO. CR07-08507

)

ORDER FOR STAY

VS.

1
1

DAVID M. ESTES,

1
Defendant.

Defendant/Appellant filed his Motion to Stay Judgment on May 16,2008. The Court
have reviewed and considered the motion hereby GRANTS Defendant/Appellantlt'sMotion to Stay
Judgment.
Dated this &day

of May, 2008.

s.

CARL B. KERRICK-District Judge

ORDER FOR STAY

CERTIFICATE OF MAILWG
I hereby certify that a true copy of
the foregoing ORDER FOR STAY was mailed,
postage prepaid, by the un ersigned at
'
Lewiston, Idaho, this 2
6 day
of
May, 2008, to:

A

-me~\~lw

Erik Johnson
P O Box 1267
Lewiston ID 83501

J

David M. Estes
1308 1 0 ~ ~ v e
Lewiston ID 83501
PATTY 0 . WEEKS, Clerk

ORDER FOR STAY

DANIEL L. SPICKLER
Nez Perce County Prosecuting
Erik L. Johnson
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
Post Office Box 1267
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
Telephone: (208) 799-3073
I.S.B.N. 5995

I N THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, I N AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE

STATE OF IDAHO,

CASE NO. CR2007-0008507

PLAINTIFF'S / RESPONDENT'S
APPELLATE BRIEF

VS.

DAVID M. ESTES,
Defendant/Appellant.

COMES NOW, Erik L. Johnson, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney for Nez Perce
County, State of Idaho, and submits the State's brief in response t o Appellant David
Estes' appeal.

FACTS
On October 16, 2007 Trooper John Ferriss of the Idaho State Police issued
David Estes an infraction citation for speeding in Nez Perce County, Idaho. On
October 25, 2007, Estes entered a plea of not guilty. On November 20, 2007, a
pretrial hearing was held. The matter was set for a court trial on December 17,
2007. On November 29, 2007, Estes filed a motion to disqualify the presiding
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judge without cause. A new judge was assigned and the trial was reset for
December 31, 2007.
On December 31, 2007, a hearing was held. The trial was continued to
March 3, 2008, due t o discovery issues. The trial was held on March 3, 2008.
Estes had previously filed a timely Request for Production of Documents requesting
certain information from the State. One request was for the "model, make, brand
name and serial number of the radar unit used in this case." The State disclosed
information relating t o a Doppler speed radar detector. I t was revealed at trial that
the officer had used a LIDAR speed detector. The State had provided discovery
unrelated to the speed detector used by the officer. Based on this, Estes made a
motion to dismiss the citation. However, the trial continued without the testimony
o f the radar speed. The Court found Estes guilty based on the officer's testimony of
his visual estimation of the vehicle's speed.

I1
ISSUES PRESENTED

Estes filed his Notice of Appeal on March 10, 2008, raising three issues:
1. Does visual estimation of speed meet the Daubert test?

2. Does the State of Idaho have to have criteria for visual estimation of
speed?
3. Did the court's failure to dismiss the allegations after the first time that
the prosecutor failed to provide discovery violate public policy that
infractions and the adjudication of these infractions be just, speedy and
inexpensive?

I n his Appellate Brief Estes raised a fourth issue:
4. I s the Appellant entitled to reasonable expenses?

State v. Estes
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ARGUMENT
1. Does visual estimation of speed meet the Daubert test?

Estes asserts that the trial court should not have admitted the opinion
testimony of the officer regarding vehicle speed. Before addressing the merits of
the question posed, the State first contends that this Court should decline the
invitation to address this issue because Estes did not object to this testimony at
trial, and any error in the admission of this testimony was not fundamental error.
By failing to object to this testimony, Estes did not preserve his right to raise this
issue for the first time on appeal. State v. Moore, 131 Idaho 814, 822 (1998);
State

V.

Bingham, 116 Idaho 415, 423 (1989).

I f this Court does address the merits, the State argues that the admission of
the officer's opinion testimony was proper. I n Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, the Supreme Court set forth rules governing expert testimony to
the admission of scientific evidence at trial. 509 U.S. 579 (1993). However, Idaho
courts have not adopted the Daubert standard for admissibility of evidence.
Swallow v. Emergency Med. O f Idaho, 138 Idaho 589, 595 n. 1 (2003). Rather,
Idaho courts use Rule 702 of the Idaho Rules of Evidence to determine admissibility
of expert testimony.
Rule 702 provides:
I f scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the
trier of fact t o understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue,
a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience,
training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or
otherwise.
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The trial court's broad discretion in admitting evidence will only be disturbed on
appeal when there has been a clear abuse o f discretion.

State v. Menuin, 131

Idaho 642, 646 (1998).
The trial transcript shows that Trooper Ferriss testified regarding his visual
estimation o f Estes' speed. Trooper Ferriss testified that he was stationary on U.S.
Highway 95 on the Lewiston Hill. Tr. 5. Trooper Ferriss was standing outside o f his
patrol car when he saw Estes' vehicle traveling southbound. Tr. 6. He estimated
the vehicle's speed to be 65 miles per hour in a posted 55 mile per hour speed
zone. Tr. 7. Trooper Ferriss testified that Estes'vehicle was traveling alone and
that he had a clear, unobstructed view o f the vehicle. Tr. 21.
Trooper Ferriss also testified regarding his training and experience in
estimating a vehicle's speed. When he was attending the basic POST Academy and
the State Police Academy in 1988 he was trained to estimate a vehicle's speed
while in a traveling mode and while stationary. Tr. 6. Trooper Ferriss is required to
maintain his proficiency in speed estimation in order to requalify for his speed radar
certification. Tr. 6, 18. The standard of accuracy that must be achieved to be
certified in speed estimation is plus or minus five miles per hour of the actual speed
of the vehicle. Tr. 7. Trooper Ferriss testified that he can estimate a vehicle's
speed from 700-800 feet away. Tr. 14. Trooper Ferriss also testified that his
training is essentially ongoing, as he uses speed estimation skills in his everyday
patrol duties. Tr. 7.
Applying Trooper Ferriss' testimony to I.R.E. 702, he testified regarding his
knowledge, skill, experience, and training in the visual estimation o f a vehicle's
speed. Starting with his basic training in 1988, Trooper Ferriss has approximately
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20 years of training, re-certifications, and on-duty application of this skill. Trooper
Ferriss qualifies as an expert in the visual estimation of a vehicle's speed under the
standards set forth in I.R.E. 702.
Even though Trooper Ferriss has advanced training in estimating a vehicle's
speed, the State argues that a person without such advanced training can also
testify regarding an estimate a vehicle's speed. I n Werth

v. Tromberg,

the court

allowed a citizen witness t o testify about his visual estimation of a vehicle's speed.
90 Idaho 204, 208 (1965). Before allowing such testimony, the court required a
foundation as to the witness' knowledge of the area, familiarity with speed and
specifically, of the speed of the type of vehicle he observed, prior observations of
the speed of such vehicles and his checking of such speed with his own
speedometer while he was driving. Id. The witness then estimated the vehicle's
speed at about 70 miles per hour. Id.
The court opined that "[ilt has been held almost without exception in this
country that a person of reasonable intelligence and ordinary experience who has
had sufficient opportunity to view the speed of a moving object may state his
opinion of such speed." Id. (citing 32 C.J.S. Evidence

5

546(53) and (54)). I n

another case, the Idaho Court of Appeals allowed testimony of a lay witness as to a
vehicle's speed. Smith

v. Praegitzer, 113 Idaho 887, 891 (Ct. App. 1988). The

Court stated that "[s]uch evidence may be accepted as probative, competent
evidence; the weight to be given it rests with the trier of fact." Id.
The magistrate court found Estes guilty of speeding based on the officer's
visual observation. The officer estimated Estes' speed at 65 miles per hour in a
posted 55 mile per hour zone. To be certified Trooper Ferriss can be off a
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maximum of five miles per hour over or under the actual speed of the vehicle.
Even if Trooper Ferriss' estimate was off by five miles per hour in Estes' favor, his
vehicle would still have been traveling over the posted speed limit. The precise
amount by which a speed limit is exceeded is not an essential element of the
offense of speeding; it is only necessary that the evidence show that the limit was
exceeded. See I.C.

5 49-654.

Estes did not preserve this issue for appeal by timely objecting to the
testimony a t trial. Further, it is the State's position that Trooper Ferriss meets the
requirements to testify as an expert in the visual estimation of speed based upon
his knowledge, skill, experience, and training. Based on Idaho case law, Trooper
Ferriss could also testify to the same as a lay witness pursuant to I.R.E. 701.
2. Does the State of Idaho have to have criteria for visual estimation

of speed?
This issue was raised in Estes' Notice of Appeal but not specifically addressed
in his Appellant Brief. Estes has not cited and the State is not aware of any
statutory or case law requiring criteria for the visual estimation of speed. To the
extent that this issue relates to opinion testimony please refer to section 1 above.
3. Did the court's failure to dismiss the allegations after the first
time that the prosecutor failed to provide discovery violate public

policy that infractions and the adjudication of these infraction be
just, speedy and inexpensive?
The current incarnation of the Idaho Infraction Rules took effect on July 1,
1983. The infraction rules contain no reference to a time frame in which a trial
must be held. Idaho Code section 19-3501 mandates that criminal defendants
must be brought to trial within certain time frames. However, section 19-3501
does not apply to infractions. State v. Burtlow, 144 Idaho 455, (Ct. App. 2007).

State v. Estes
Plaintiff's / Respondent's Appellate Brief

6
,~-.

Estes has not cited any statutory or case law, and the State is not aware of any,
that would have required the magistrate court to dismiss the charge. The
magistrate court did not err in denying Estes' motion to dismiss.
4. I s the Appellant Entitled to Reasonable Expenses?

Estes raises the issue of his expenses for the first time in his Appellate brief.
As in sections 2 and 3 above, Estes has not cited any law, and the state is not
aware of any, t o allow the court to award expenses in an infraction case. The State
requests this Court deny the request for expenses.

v
CONCLUSION
Estes did not object to testimony regarding visual estimation of speed and
therefore did not preserve the issue for appeal. However, if the Court does address
this issue, the testimony was properly admitted under both I.R.E. 701 and 702.
Estes has not provided any statutory or case law showing that the State of Idaho is
required to have criteria for the visual estimation of speed, justifying a dismissal of
his case, or entitling him to fees. The State requests that this Court affirm the
decision of the magistrate court.
Respectfully submitted this

&

day of lune, 2008.

B

Deputy rosecuting Attorney
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Ideclare under penalty of perjury that a full, true, complete and correct copy
of the foregoing PLAINTIFF'S / RESPONDENT'S APPELLATE BRIEF was

(1) -hand delivered, or
(2) -hand delivered via court basket, or

(3) -sent via facsimile, or
(4)

mailed, postage prepaid, by depositing the same i n the
United States Mail

ADDRESSED TO THE FOLLOWING:
David Estes
1308 lothAvenue
Lewiston, ID 83501
DATED this

&

day of lune,
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APPELLANT'S REPLY BRJEF
Appeal from the Magistrate Court of the Second Judicial District for Nez Perce County.
Honorable Jay Gaskill, Magistrate Judge, presiding.

Erik Johnson,
Nez Perce County
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Pro Se
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1. ARGUMENT
1.l. DID THE APPELLANT LOSE HIS RIGHT TO APPEAL BECAUSE HE DID NOT
RAtSE A TIMELY OBJECTION ?
The state in its brief at page 3 avers that the appellant did not raise a timely objection to the
visual estimation of speed testimony of the state's witness. The record does not support such a
claim. The record at page 10 shows that the appellant objected and asked that the cause be
dismissed. The state plainly stated it was going to proceed on the basis of visual estimation of
speed. The court then ruled that the state could proceed. Any M e r objection would have been
moot. ( TR 10 ) The court had ruled on the issue.
At the end of the testimony, the court asked the appellant if he had any witnesses or wished to
testify. When the appellant stated he did not, the court simply ruled that the state had met its
burden of proof and found for the state. The court did not allow any closing arguments or give
the appellant the chance to object to the courl's prior ruling. ( TR 21 and 22 )
1.2. DID THE COURT ALLOW THE STATE TO PROCEED TO TRIAL WITHOUT A
LEGAL BASIS ?
As averred in the appellant's original brief there is no scientific evidence to support visual
estimation of speed. An exchange with the Idaho State Police Academy and the Attorney
General's Office is even more t e l I i .

$.'
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After the hearing, the appellant began a series of public records requests with the Idaho P.O.S.T.
Academy and the Idaho State Police Academy on the subject of visual estimation of speed. On
April 16", 2008, the appellant sent a public records request to the Idaho State Police. In response
to the request a, K.Am Cronin, Special Assistant wrote that the I.S.P. did not maintain or
compile records on the visual estimation of speed. ( Attachment I ) In response to the letter, the
appellant again wrote to Ms. Cronin demanding fiirther clarification of her letter of 28 April
since it called into question the testimony of Trooper Femss in this case. ( Attachment II )

My letter of 20 May was referred to an Assistant Attorney General named Jenny Grunke. Ms.
Grunke's letter confirmed the information given to me by Ms. Cronin was accurate. In her letter
Ms. Grunke advised that the I.S.P. did not have a separate and distinct method of speed
measurement entitled visual estimation of speed nor did the I.S.P. provide a certification
specific to such a method. ( Attachment 111) That letter section directly contxadicted Trooper
Ferriss' statement under oath. ( TR 6 and 7) Trooper Femss testified that he was certified on
visual estimation of speed.
Based on the Grunke letter of 22 May 2008, a f o r d complaint was made to the Idaho State
Police Office of Internal Investigations asking that Trooper Ferriss be investigated for perjury
while testifying under oath. ( Attachment IV )

The I.S.P. through a Captain Kevin Hudgens responded to the complaint. Captain Hudgens
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advised that the I.S.P. does not certify on the visual estimation of speed. Capt. Hudgens did say
that the visual estimation of speed is included in the overall instruction on speed detection.
( Attachment V ) What the averments by the Idaho State Police Show is that there is no

certification of visual estimation of speed nor do they know of any scientific evidence
pertaking to the visual estimation of speed. The Trooper's own testimony shows that the
visual estimation of speed is questionable. When asked what his accuracy rate was in estimating
speed, the trooper testified he did not recollect. ( TR 18 ) Yet the trooper testified he was
required to estimate six moving and six stationary ( TR 18) ( Meaning six vehicles while the
trooper was moving and six while in a stationary position. ) If he did not achieve the desired
standard he would not re-qualify on the radar. The trooper should certainly have know his
accuracy if his job depended on it.
The point is that the court has allowed a conviction when there is no legal basis for the ruling.
There is no legal standards that can be applied to the visual estimation of speed. That is why
radar was invented. After years of court acceptance of radar and a need for such devices the
courts cannot allow that technology to be discarded in favor of a standard that has no scientific
basis and there is no consensus on how it is applied or taught.
1.3. DID THE COURT ERR BY ALLOWING A WITNESS TO BE DECLARED AN EXPERT
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The state is .trying to declare that Trooper Ferriss is an expert in visual estimation of speed. First
the state proceeded on a theory that the radar used was accurate gave the true speed of the
appellant's vehicle. When that radar reading was disallowed, the state changed its theory and
proceeded on the theory of visual estimation of speed. ( TR 10 ) The appellant had come
prepared to defend his position on the basis of a Doppler radar. The state blindsided him by
giving him information on a Doppler radar. When the testimony began, it was discovered that

the radar used was a laser radar not a Doppler. (This was the second time the state had failed to
provide discovery.) The state then decided to use its only witness, Trooper Ferriss, as an expert
witness on visual estimation of speed Again the appellant was blindsided by the state. The
appellant was not informed that the trooper was an expert witness nor was any of his
qualifications as an expert witness made available to the appellant
Next the state changed its legal theory to visual estimation of speed without notice to the
appellant that it intended to introduce such evidence. The appellant was again caught
unawares of the evidence to be presented. The rules of discovery are designed to allow
a liberal discovery process, the purpose of which are to provide parties with
information essential to litigation of the issues, to e l i i a t e surprise and to promote
setttement. ( 23 Am.Jur.2d, Depositions and Discovery section 1, quoting Brown v. Katz, 868
N.E. 2d 1159 (hd. Ct. of App. 2007) )

II. CONCLUSION

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF

2.1. The record shows that the appellant did in fact ask for a dismissal of the charges at the time

that the state declared its intent to proceed on a legal theory of visual estimation of speed.
The appellant asked for a dismissal and the court ruled on the issue of the visual estimation of
speed. That d i g changed the entire theory on which this case was prosecuted. No notice was
given to the appellant that the state intended to use its only witness as an expert. In the end the
court allowed the state to present its case while the appellant was at a great disadvantage.
The court has allowed a conviction on the basis of a theory that has no scientific basis and the
appointing authority has no# consensus on its reliability and application. The trooper testified that
he was certified on visual estimation of speed. The Idaho State Police and the Attorney General
stated that no such certification existed. If you believe them then their trooper has committed
perjury. The point is that visual estimation of speed standing by itself should not be used as the
basis for convicting a person of speeding.

~ of July 2008.
Dated this 2 1Day

--------p!-~~g--&-:A~~-&z:
--..-----------David M. Estes, Appellant Pro Se
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Idaho State Police
Service since 1939
CL "Butch" Oner
Govempr.
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April 28,2008
David Estes
1308 loLhAvenue
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
RE:

PUBLIC RECORDS REQUEST

Dear Mr. Estes:
The Idaho State Police has received your request dated April 16,2008, for information under
Idaho's Public Writings Act.

REQUEST: Regarding officer training information. Request cc of any training criteria for
officers in visual estimation of speed; scientific research to support state's assertion that an
officer can visually estimate the speed of a vehicle; any research done to support training of
officers on visual estimation of speed; any rules that require an officer to certify on use of speed
measuring devices.
RESPONSE: After consultation with the attorney for the Idaho State Police, your request is
partially denied as this is a record that ldaho State Police does not compile or maintain the
information requested, pursuant to IDAHOCODE5 9-337(13).
You have a right to appeal this denial of your request by filing a petition in conformance with the
piovisions of the ldaho Public Writings Act, Idaho Code 5 9-343. Your petition must be filed in
the Fourth Judicial District Court of Idaho within one hundred eighty (180) calendar days of the
mailing of this response.
Sincerely,

II

K. knn Cronin
Special Assistant

.

83680-0700* (208)884-7000*Fax (208)884-7090
EQUAL OPPORTUNITY EMPLOYER

I
I
I
1
I
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May 20,2008
K Ann Cronin
Special & i t
Idaho State Police
P.0. BOX 700
Meridian, Idaho 83680

Sent with this letter is a copy of your letter dated the 28th of April 2008. AS I read the
letter, more questions are raised than answered.
When you sent the speed measuring device information you did not cite to any
training manual or department policy. I cannot tell where the material is located in
your system in the event that I would have to h u e a subpoena for the information at
a future date.
You state in responseto my request for information on the visual estimation of speed
that you do notmmpile o r - d t a i n information on that subject. Your letter do& not
state what o r g e t i o n or individual that does maintain such information.
According to your troopers you do teach visual &hation of speed and do cemfy
your t r o o p e ~in the visual estimation of speed. I f you are saying that you don't then
one of your troopers has committed perjury and I would subpoena you and the State
Academy head to testif;f to thatfad. I doubt that is the case however.
My position is this. You have at least one instructor who teaches the visual estimation
of speed class. That instructor has a lesson plan from which he / she teaches. I want a
copy of that lesson plan. I do not want someone to explain the class to me. I want
copies of the lesson plan. If you or the academy instructo~do not maintaina lesson
plan or policy on visualestimation of speed please state so.

Thank you for your attention in this matter*

Sincerely,

&1
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STATE OF IDAHO
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

LAWRENCE G. WASDEN

May 22,2008

I
I

I
1
1
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David M. Estes
1308 1o ' ~Avenue
Liwiston, Idaho 83501

RE:

PUB1,lC RECORDS REQUEST

Dear Mr. Estes:
Your letter dated May 20,2008, to Ms. Cronin, Special Assistant, Idaho State Police, has been
forwarded to me for response. The record that you were sent was from the Idaho State Police
Employee Manual and is ldaho State Police Procedure number 07.15. That is the cite for where
the record is located.

I liave confirmed that the Idaho State Police does not compile or maintain information on the
visual estimation of speed. The ldaho State Police does not have a separate and distinct method
of speed measurement entitled "Visual Estimation of Speed", nor does it provide a certification
specific to such a method. The Idaho State Police does not have a separate course of training or
a lesson plan for visual estimation of speed. Visual estimation is simply a general description of
the means any individual would first use to make a determination about an occurrence or
process: use of one or more of the senses to invite further assessment about whether an anomaly
of some kind exists.

If, for example, a trooper driving his patroI vehicle at a speed of 55 miles per hour notes a
vehicle traveling in the same direction that is pulling away from him, he uses his sense of sight to
make that initial determination. This is simple visual estimation that is then confirmed by one of
the methods we do teach, e.g. radar, lidar, or stopwatch.
If you have any questions, please contact me at (208) 884-7050.
sincerely,

I

Jenny C. Grunke
Deputy Attorney General
[Idaho State Police

71

cc: Ann Cronin
M@&&&NT'SREPLY BRIgF
nminaf l a w Division. Idaho State Poiice
P.O. Box 700. Meridian. ldaho 83680-0700

Telephone: (208) 884-7050. FAX:(208) 884-7090
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1308lothAV
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
208.746.1744

May 29,2008

Lt. Col. Kevin Johnson
Idaho State Police
PO Box 700
Meridian, Idaho 83680-700
Dear Sir:
I am currently involved in a dispute with your agency over a traflic incident The case
number for that incident is Nez P e m County CRo7-08507. At the hearing, I was
s u m f u l in getting the radar reading excluded. However the court decided to
convict on the trooper's visual estimation of speed I appealed that ruling and am
waiting for the County to respond to my brief. I intend on asking the court to not hear
the appeal but send it direct to the state supreme court because of the issues involved.

While doing research on the issue in question, referred to as the visual estimation of
speed, I sent a couple of public m r d s requests to your agency. Eventually I got the
letter that is sent with this missive from the Attorney General's office attached to your
WWcy.
The problem is this.The Attorney General's office states that your agency does not
certify officers on the visual estimation of speed nor does it have any lesson plan or
course of W i n g on visual estimation of speed. Your hoper, a John F e d ,
testified in court that he had to be certified on radar and had to pass a test on visual
estimation of speed or he would not be certified on the use of radar. Trmper Ferriss'
testimony was used to find me guilty of speeding. When you read this letter, it
contradicts the trooper's testimony and in effect denies that the Idaho State Police
teaches visual estimation of speed That means that either the Attorney General is
mistaken or your trooper committed perjury. That iswhy I am writing to you
In addition to the court hearing I encountered Trooper Feniss after the hearing in
Lewiston Idaho. It was towards the end of April 2008. I was sitting in a left turn only
Iane with a signal that has a green arrow and is separatedfmm the other signal lights.
Trooper Ferriss was sitting in fmnt of me. Trooper Ferris got out of his car and came
back to my truck He asked me if my signals were working and why I did not: have my
left signal on. I turned the signal on. Trooper F e k then stated, " I guess that you
have to turn it on to make it work" He then returned to his vehicle. By then the light
had cycled though a p e n arrow and back to a red arrow.

I know of no reason for the trooper to act the way he did I know of no law that
requires you to turn on your signal when you are in a turn only Iane with a separate
signal light and the light had not turned green. I can only assume the trooper was not
happy that I had embarrassed him at the trial and he wanted to needle me to let me
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF
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know that he had not forgotten. I would not have complained about the incident had
1 not received the letter I did.

..

Considering what has transpired I feel that an adrrrrmshil.tive investigation is
warranted to determine what the facts are. My position is that in light of the letter
£rom the Attorney General your trooper has committed pejury and I intend on
bringing .this to the attention of the court at some point In the meantime, I am
making a formal request to your office to investjgate this matter. I do not want to
destroy a trooper's career if there is an explanation.

Sincerely,

David Estes

DEstes3584@0l.~C~m
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Idaho State Police
-

Service since 1939
Colonel G. ] e m Russell

C.L. % u W otter
Governs

June 11,2008
-
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David M. Estes
1308 1O'h Avenue
Lewiston, Idaho 83501

RE:

DISPUTED TRAFFIC INCIDENT

Dear Mr. Estes:

II
1
II

a
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I
II
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Your letter dated May 29,2008, to Lt. Col. Keyin Johnson, Idaho State
r
The question you pose, is :
Police, has beekfomarded to me f ~ response..
whether the 1daho.State Police certifies officers on t~e'visualestimation-of
speed.

.
.

.

..

' .

..

.

.

The short answer to your question is no, the Idaho State Police does not
conduct a separate course of instruction or certification 011 the visual
estimation of speed. However, the Idaho State Police does certify troopers
in Speed Detection, and during this course of instruction the visual
estimation of speed is included in this instruction.
The current course of instruction for becoming certified in Speed Detection
includes twenty-four hours of classroom and practical exercises to include
the visual estimation of speed. Each student, as part of practical exercises,
while riding with a certified instructor must conduct 10 moving and 10
stationary visual estimations of speed and be within 5 miles per hours of the
instructors radar reading. This test must be passed with 100% accuracy.
Upon completing the classroon~and practical portion of instruction the
student must then complete an additional 40 hours of practical exercise
training in speed detection conducted while on duty. During this training
students visually estimate the speed of vehicles and then check that speed
with radar. Again, the student's visual estimation must be within 5 miles per
hour of the radar reading to be valid. During this time, no enforcement
action can be taken relating to speed obtained by radar while the student is
- APPELLANT'S REPL$+&~& 700,Meridian, Idaho 83680.0700
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completing this 40-hour block. Once all training is complete, the student
becomes certified in Speed Detection. This training follows the guidelines
set forth by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration.
In reference to your question relating to a law requiring one to signal when
in a turn only lane with a separate signal light. I believe Idaho Code 49-808
covers your question. Sub section one states:

"Noperson shall turn a vehicle onto a highway or move a vehicle
right or left upon a highway or merge onto or exitfrom a'highway unless
and until the movement can be made with reasonable safe@ nor without
giving an appropriate signal"
The definition of a "Highway" is contained in Idaho Code 49-109,
Definitions, section 11, subsectibn 5.

"Highway" means the entire width between the boundary lines of
every way publicly maintained when anypart is open to the use of thepublic
for vehicular travel, with jurisdiction extending to the adjacent property
line, including sidewalks, shoulders, berms and rights-of-way not intended
for motorized traffic. The term "street " is interchangeable with highway.
,I

If you have additional questions please contact me at (208) 884-7202.
Sincerely,

Idaho State Police
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4.1. The court is asked to enter an order recommending permissionto appeal directly to the

Idaho State Supreme Court.
Dated this 215' day of July 2008.
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Lewiston, ldaho 83501
Telephone: (208) 799-3073
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I N THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE s E c o
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L DISTRICT OF THC
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I

STATE OF IDAHO,

CASE NO. CR2007-0008507

Plaintiff/Respondent,
State's Response to Appellant's
Motion t o Certify Appeal to t h e
I d a h o Supreme Court

vs.
DAVID M. ESTES,

COMES NOW, Erik L. Johnson, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney for Nez
Perce County, State of Idaho, and submits its response objecting to Mr.
Estes' motion to certify this appeal directly to the Idaho Supreme Court.
Mr. Estes bases his motion on Idaho Appellate Rule 12.l(c)(l).

Rule

12.1 is entitled "Permissive appeal in custody cases." This rule addressing
child custody and Child Protective Act proceedings does not apply to the
present infraction case. The State respectfully requests that the Court deny
the motion.
DATED this

Z&

day of July, 2008.

State's Response to Appellant's
Motion to Certify Appeal to the
Idaho Supreme Court
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Ideclare under penalty of perjury that a full, true, complete and
correct copy of the foregoing State's Response to Appellant's Motion to
Certify Appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court was

(1) -hand delivered, or
(2) -hand delivered via court basket, or
(3) -sent via facsimile, or
mailed, postage prepaid, by depositing the same in the
United States Mail.

(4)

ADDRESSED TO THE FOLLOWING:
David Estes
1308 loth venue
Lewiston, I D 83501
DATED this

4-

day of July, 2008.
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Motion to Certify Appeal to the
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case from the District Court to the ldaho State Supreme Court.
This motion is based on the following:

I. Facts
1.1. On March 10' 2008, the defendant filed an appeal from the Magistrate Division to the
District court. The parties briefs are complete and the case awaits a hearing date.

1.2. The main issue in this case is whether a police officer's visual estimation of speed can be
the sole basis for determining whether an accused should be tried and found guilty of violating
speed laws
II. Argument
2.1 The issues in this case are of general import to all citizens of the State of ldaho which
requires that the State Supreme Court needs to give guidance on. If this case was left to stand,
then it would make the use of speed detection devices obsolete and unnecessary. A police
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4.1. The court is asked to enter an order recommending permissionto appeal directly to the

Idaho State Supreme Court.
Dated this 1' day of August 2008.
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David M. Estes, Appellant
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Mr. Johnson and Mr. Estes present.
Mr. Estes addresses the Court re: Appellant's Motion to Certify Appeal to Idaho State
Supreme Court.
Court denies Appellant's Motion to Certify Appeal to Idaho State Supreme Court.
Mr. Estes presents argument on appeal.
Mr. Johnson presents argument on appeal.
Mr. Estes presents rebuttal argument.
Court takes matter under advisement and will issue written decision.
Court recess.

COURT MINUTES

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR TISE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
STATE OF IDAHO,
PlaintiffIRespondent,
v.
DAVID M. ESTES,
Defendant'Appellmt.

1

1
1
1
1
1
1
1

CASE NO. CR-07-08507
ORDER ON APPEAL

)

This matter came before the Court on Defendant'Appellant's appeal of the
Magistrate's determination that Mr. Estes committed the infraction offense of violating
the posted speed limit'. The Defendant/Appellant, David Estes, proceededpro se in the
matter. The State of Idaho was represented by Nez Perce County Deputy Prosecutor Erik
Jolmson. The Court heard oral argument on this matter on August 5,2008. The Court,
having heard argument and being fully advised in the matter, hereby renders its decision.

'

At argument, the Appellant also presented a Motion to Certify Appeal to Idaho State Supreme Court,
seeking permissive appeal of the issue to the Idaho Supreme Court. This Court, determining the matter was
not an interlocutory order, denied the motion on the record.
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FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On October 16,2007, Trooper John Feniss of the Idaho State Police issued an
infraction citation to David Estes for speeding in Nez Perce County, Idaho. Tr. at 5. Mr.
Estes appeared in court and denied the charge on October 25,2007. A pretrial hearing
was held on November 20, 2007, and the matter was set for a court trial on December 17,
2007. On November 29,2007, Mr. Estes filed a motion to disqualify the magistrate
judge assigned, thus a new judge was assigned and the court trial was rescheduled for
December 3 1,2007.
A hearing was held December 3 1,2007, and at that time Mr. Estes made a motion

to dismiss the matter based upon the State's failure to provide discovery. The motion to
dismiss was denied, and the matter was once again reset for court trial, to be held on
March 3,2008. The court trial proceeded on this date, with the State presenting Trooper
John Ferriss, of the Idaho State Police, as its first witness. Trooper Ferriss first testified
that he visually estimated Mr. Estes' vehicle traveling 65 miles per hour. See Tr. at 7.
Trooper Ferriss then testified regarding the radar used to record the speed of the vehicle,
to which Mr. Estes objected. Upon objection it was revealed that the State provided
inconect information in discovery. The State provided Mr. Estes information regarding
the wrong type of speed measuring device. See Tr. at 8-10. At that point, Mr. Estes
motioned the Court to dismiss the case, to which the State responded that they would like
to proceed; however, the State would not present information from the radar device used.
The Court excluded any testimony regarding radar, and the cout trial continued. Tr. at
10.
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Trooper Ferriss continued to testify regarding his training in visually estimating
speed, and then was cross-examined by Mr. Estes. At the conclusion of Trooper Ferris's
testimony, neither the State nor Mr. Estes elected to call any other witnesses. Tr. at 2122. At that time, the magistrate determined that the State met its burden to prove the
speeding violation, and assessed a penalty of $75.00. Tr. at 22. Mr. Estes subsequently
appealed, and the matter is now before this Court.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
"[Iln Idaho infractions are deemed criminal offenses for purposes of both
constitutional and statutory analysis . . . ." State v. George, 127 Idaho 693, 698, 905 P.2d
626, 63 1 (1995). When a criminal action is tried to a court sitting without a jury,
appellate review of sufficiency of the evidence is limited to ascertaining whether there is
substantial evidence upon which the magistrate court could have found that the
prosecution met its burden of proving the essential elements of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt. See State v. Bethuieser, 143 Idaho 582,588, 149 P.3d 857, 863 (Ct.
App. 2006); see also State v. Smith, 139 Idaho 295,298,77 P.3d 984,987 (Ct.App.2003).
A reviewing court may not substitute its judgment for that of the fact finder as to
credibility of the witnesses, the weight of testimony, and the reasonable inferences to be
drawn from the evidence. Id.; citing State v. Vandenacre, 131 Idaho 507,5 10,960 P.2d
190, 193 (Ct.App.1998); State v. Hickman, 119 Idaho 366, 367, 806 P.2d 959, 960
(Ct.App.1991).
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ISSUES ON APPEAL
1. Was there sufficient evidence, based upon the Trooper's visual estimation of
speed, for the magistrate court to find the prosecution met its burden of proving
the traffic infraction occurred?
2. Did the magistrate court's failure to dismiss the infraction violate public policy
that adjudication of infractions be just, speedy, and inexpensive?

ANALYSIS
1. Was there sufficient evidence, based upon the Trooper's visual estimation of
speed, for the magistrate court to find the prosecution met its burden of
proving the traffic infraction occurred?
The magistrate court determined that the State had met its burden of proving that
the DefendantlAppellant had been traveling in excess of the maximum limit of speed
posted, in this case, traveling over fifty-five (55) miles per hour, I.C. ?j49-652(2). The
magistrate was presented with the testimony of Trooper Ferriss, the officer who wrote the
infraction citation, and no rebuttal evidence was presented.
The DefendantlAppellant argues that the magistrate abused his discretion in
relying on the testimony of Trooper Ferriss, specifically, the Trooper's testimony
regarding the visual estimate of speed that the DefendantlAppellant was traveling.
Evidence from the radar device the Trooper employed was excluded on the basis that
proper discovery was not provided to the Defendant prior to trial. Tr. at 8-10. The
DefendantlAppellant argues that the criteria set forth in Daubert v. Mevrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993) has not
been met, nor was the Trooper's testimony admissible pursuant to LR.E. 702.
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In Idaho, the appropriate method for introducing scientific evidence through
expert testimony is pursuant to I.R.E. 702.~See State v. Gleason, 123 Idaho 62,65,844
P.2d 691, 694 (1992). "If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist
the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify
thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise." I.R.E. 702.
To give expert opinion testimony, a witness must first be qualified as
an expert on the matter at hand. See IHC Hosp., Inc. v. Board of
Commissioners, 108 Idaho 136,697 P.2d 1150 (1985); I.R.E. 702.
Whether a witness is sufficiently qualified as an expert is a matter largely
within the discretion of the trial court. Sidwell v. William Prym, Inc., 112
Idaho 76,730 P.2d 996 (1986). Once the witness is qualified as an
This Court recognizes that our neighboring state, Washington, takes a slightly different approach to its
interpretation of its similar rule of evidence, and employs the test set forth in Frye v. UnitedStates, 54
App.D.C. 46,47,293 F. 1013, 1014 (1923) in addition to its application of the rule of evidence.
Unless an exaggerated popular opinion of the accuracy of the particular technique makes its use
prejudicial or likely to mislead the jury, the better approach is to admit all relevant scientific
evidence in the same manner as other expert testimony and allow its weight to be attacked by
cross examination or refutation. Clark 762 P.2d at 856. The evidentiaty rule relied on in Clark,
Montana Rule of Evidence 702, is identical to Fed.R.Evid. 702 and Washington's ER 702. All
three state: If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion
or otherwise. A conclusion similar to Clark was reached in State v. Gleason, 123 Idaho 62, 844
P.2d 691, 694 (1992), wherein the court reaffirmed the plurality opinion in Garrett. Garrett held
the appropriate test for measuring the scientific reliability of evidence, including HGN evidence,
is Idaho Rule of Evidence 702, not Frye. A similar result has been reached in Oregon under
Oregon evidentiary rules. See State v. Brown, 297 Or. 404,687 P.2d 751 (1984); Oregon v.
O'Key, 123 0r.App. 54, 858 P.2d 904 (1993); State v. Reed, 83 0r.App. 451, 732 P.2d 66
(1987).
Although Washington recognizes that other jurisdictions have rejected Frye in favor of a
more liberal test of admissibility based on the relevance standard of the Federal Rules of
Evidence, it nevertheless has continued to employ Frye when determining the admissibility of
evidence based on novel scientific procedures. State v. Cauthron, 120 Wash.2d 879, 886,846
P.2d 502 (1993). Cauthron was decided prior to Daubertv. MerreN Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509
U.S. 579, ----,113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993). Daubert held the "general acceptance"
standard of Frye does not govern trials conducted under the Federal Rules of Evidence. Under
Fed.R.Evid. 702, if a witness qualifies as an expert, the merits and demerits of a particular
scientific test, approach or procedure are simply matters for the jury to sort out. However, until
such time as our Supreme Court abandons Frye and interprets ER 702 in the same manner as
Daubert interpreted Fed.R.Evid. 702, we are bound by Cauthron and previous decisions.
State v. Cissne, 72 Wash. App. 677,685-686, 865 P.2d 564,568-569 (Wash. App. 1994). The Cissne
Court correctly sets forth the distinction between Washington and Idaho law on this issue. In Idaho,
the determination of admissibility is pursuant to I.R.E. 702.
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expert, the trial court must determine whether such expert opinion
testimony will assist the trier of fact in understanding the evidence. Id.;
I.R.E. 702. If the testimony is thus competent and relevant, it may be
admissible; the weight given to the testimony is left to the trier of fact.
IHC Hosp., Inc. v. Board of Commissioners, supra. The admissibility of
expert opinion testimony is discretionary with the trial court and will not
be disturbed absent a showing of abuse of discretion. Sidwell v. William
Prym, Inc., supra.

State v. Hopkins, 113 ldaho 679,680-681,747 P.2d 88, 89-90 (Ct. App. 1987).
The magistrate court did not abuse his discretion in allowing Trooper Ferriss to
testify as to his determination of the DefendantIAppellant's speed of travel based upon
his training and experience in visually estimating the speed of a traveling vehicle.
In addition, the magistrate court did not err in finding that the
DefendantlAppellant was traveling at a speed above the maximum speed limit. There
was sufficient evidence before the magistrate to support this determination. Trooper
Ferris' testimony that the DefendantlAppellant was traveling over the speed limit was
sufficient evidence to support the court's determination3. Further, no evidence was
submitted to suggest that the DefendantlAppellant was traveling at or below the posted
speed limit. Therefore, the magistrate's finding that the DefendantlAppellant violated the
posted speed limit is affirmed.
2. Did the magistrate court's failure to dismiss the infraction violate public
policy that adjudication of infractions be just, speedy, and inexpensive?

The DefendantlAppellant argues that the magistrate court erred by failing to
dismiss the infraction when the adjudication of the matter failed to be just, speedy, and
inexpensive. The infraction in question was issued on October 16,2007. The matter
When silting in an appellate capacity, this Court is precluded from substituting its judgment for that of the
fact finder regarding credibility of witnesses, the weight of testimony, and the reasonable inferences to be
drawn e o m the evidence. State v. Bettwieser, 143 Idaho 582, 588, 149 P.3d 857, 863 (Ct. App. 2006);
Stafe v. Vandenacre, 131 Idaho 507,510,960 P.2d 190, 193 (Ct. App. 1998); State v. Hickman, 119 ldaho
366,367, 806 P.2d 959,960 (Ct. App. 1991).
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came before the magistrate for a court trial on March 3,2008. The matter was originally
set for court trial on December 17, 2007; however, this date was vacated and reset
following the DefendanVAppellant's motion to disqualify the judge. Upon appointment
of the current magistrate judge, the matter was set for trial on December 3 1, 2007. On
that date, the DefendantiAppellant filed a motion to dismiss based upon the State's failure
to provide adequate discovery. Following argument regarding discovery on December
3 1,2007, the matter was then set for trial on March 3,2008, allowing adequate time for
all discovery issues to be resolved in the matter.
I.C.

19-3501 sets forth time limits for the prosecution of felony and

misdemeanor criminal cases. This section "makes no provision for infractions which are
prosecuted by filing a citation or a written complaint pursuant to Idaho Infraction Rule
3(a), (b)." State V. Burtlow, 144 Idaho 455,457, 163 P.3d 244, 246 (Ct. App. 2007).
Neither do the Idaho Infraction Rules set forth a requirement that infractions be
prosecuted under a required timeline such as that set forth in I.C.

5 19-3501.

Further, the DefendantiAppellant supports his argument by reliance on a case
from the State of Washington, City ofKirkland v. Ellis, 82 Wa. App. 819,920 P.2d 206
(1996). The DefendanVAppellant urges this Court to follow the policy he argues is set
forth in this case, namely that Washington State Infraction Rules shall be construed to
secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every infraction case. Kivkland
is distinguishable from the case at hand for several reasons. First, as stated above, the
Idaho Infraction Rules do not provide a time limit for the prosecution of infractions.
Second, the facts of City of Kirkland v. Ellis differ from the case before this
Court. In the Washington case, the defendants in question were cited for speeding. Id. at
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822,920 P.2d at 208. Each defendant sought to contest their respective tickets, and each
sought to have the presence of the radar technician at their contested hearings. Id. at 823,
920 P.2d at 209. The defendants were told they only needed to submit their requests for
the technician's presence in writing. Id. At the time of the contested hearings, no radar
technicians were available or present. Id. The district court judge continued the
hearings, to which each of the defendants objected, arguing the continuance was unfair
because the defendants would be required to miss another day of work and the
continuance was solely due to the City's error of not providing the technicians. Id.
Following the grant of continuance, the defendants sought a writ of
mandamus/prohibition from the Washington Superior Court. The writ was granted and
the Washington state district court was prohibited from presiding at the contested
hearings and mandated to dismiss the infraction cases without prejudice. Id.
On appeal, the Washington Appellate Court determined that the Superior Court
did not err in issuing the writ as the defendants had no adequate remedy at law to
challenge the district court's determination at that time4. Id. at 829, 920 P.2d at 212.
Also at issue was whether a continuance was appropriate, based upon the City's unclear
procedures that a defendant must follow to ensure a radar technician would be present at
the contested hearing. Id. at 830, 920 P.2d at 212. The Appellate Court concluded "that
the City failed to exercise due diligence and that no good cause for a continuance existed.
Accordingly, the continuance was not 'necessary' as required by IRLJ 6.6(c) and the trial
judge exceeded his authority by granting the continuance." Id. at 83 1,920 P.2d at 213.
4

The defendants' cases arose prior to a change in Washington law. At the time of these cases, traffic
inkaction cases were not subject to appellate review under the Washington Rules for Appeal of Decisions
of Courts of Limited Jurisdiction (RALJ), but instead were governed by the Washington Civil Rules for
Courts of Limited Jurisdiction (CRLJ). Thus, the defendants' cases were generally reviewable by a lrial de
novo in Superior Court. Id. at 825,920 P.2d at 210.
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In the case before this Court, the DefendadAppellant has not shown that the
magistrate erred when he continued the hearing until March 3,2008. The Court is
sympathetic to the Defendant/Appellant in that the matter was not quickly resolved,
however, there is no showing that the case should have been dismissed rather than
continueds. Therefore, the magistrate's decision to continue the case is affirmed.6

CONCLUSION
The Defendant, David Estes, was issued a traffic citation for traveling beyond the
maximum posted speed limit. Following a court trial, the magistrate court determined
that the State had provided sufficient evidence that Mr. Estes was speeding. Mr. Estes
appealed the magistfate's determination on two issues: first, whether there was sufficient
evidence, based upon the Trooper's visual determination of speed alone, to establish that
Mr. Estes was speeding, and second, whether the magistrate erred by continuing the trial
date until March 3,2008. Based upon the foregoing analysis, the magistrate's
determination is affirmed.

* in comparison, the matter did proceed to trial within six months, which is the time limit required for
bringing a felony case to trial, should the trial not be postponed upon application of the Defendant. The
Court is cognizant that much of the delay in this matter was due to the Prosecution's failure to provide
discovery information, however, some of the delay also occurred when the DefendantlAppellant sought to
disqualify the frst magistrate judge assigned the case. Regardless, the DefendanUAppellant has not
established that the magistrate erred by continuing the matter until the March 3,2008 court trial date.
The DefendantlAppellant also sought reasonable fees should he prevail on this matter. Because the
magistrate's determinations are affmned by this Court, it is unnecessary to address the matter of fees.
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ORDER
The magistrate's determination in the foregoing matter is hereby AFFIRMED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this

c2fl4ay of September 2008
r,

CARL B. KERRICK - District Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true copy of the foregoing ORDER ON APPEAL was:
\/hand

delivered via court basket, or

mailed, postage prepaid, by the undersigned at Lewiston, Idaho, this
of September, 2008, to:

C
M
David M. Estes M
1308 10" Ave
Lewiston ID 83501
Erik Johnson
Deputy Prosecutor
P.O. Box 1267
Lewiston ID 83501
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8.1. All records automatically included pursuant to Court Rule 28.
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14
15
16
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8.2. Transcript of proceedings under Cause CR 2007-0008507 from a hearing on March 3",
2008 before the Honorable Jay Gaskill in the Magistrate Division of the District of Court of Nez
Perce County.
8.3. Brief of the Appellant filed in Cause NO: CR 2007-0008507 filed May 15* 2008.
8.4. Brief of the Respondent filed in Cause NO: CR 2007-0008507 filed June 11" ,2008.
8.5. Reply Brief of the Appellant filed in Cause NO: CR 2007-0008507 filed July 3" 2008.
CERTIFICATION

I certify:

I

a. The trial transcript of proceedings held before the Honorable Carl B. Kerrick on
August 5" 2008 has not been ordered and no fee payment is needed.
b. That ail filing fees and fees for preparation of documents have not been paid pending

23
24
25
26
27
28

a motion for permission to proceed in forrna pauperis.
c. Sewice has been made upon all parties required to be sewed pursuant to Rule 20.
Dated this 13" day of October 2008.

J?xLL$z?-&rA2rdJG
David M. Estes, Appellant
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40
41
42
43
44
46
47
48
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STATE OF IDAHO
SS

COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE :
1 David M. Estes, being sworn, deposes and says:

That I am the appellant in the above-entitled appeal and that all statements in this notice of
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1 of appeal are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.
2
3
4
5
6
-.T~~f~.&~k21ef~
7
David M. Estes, Appellant
8
9
10
11 Subscribed and sworn to before me this 13' Day of October, 2008.
12
13
14
15
16
17

4-

Notary
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25
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Residing at:
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S3sel

&.cu:ah-.
MY~ornmissionexpires:

9-/a -2"1$/

TRACEY RUSSELL
NOTARY PUBLIC
STATE OF IDAHO
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE

THE STATE OF IDAHO,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

)
)
)
)

v.

)
)
)

DAVID M. ESTES,

)
)
)

Defendant-Appellant.

SUPREME COURT NO. 35767
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE

)
)
)

I, DeAnna P. Grimm, Deputy Clerk of the District Court of
the Second Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for
the County of Nez Perce, do hereby certify that the foregoing
Clerk's Record in the above-entitled cause was compiled and bound
by me and contains true and correct copies of all pleadings,
documents, and papers designated to be included under Rule 28,
Idaho Appellate Rules, the Notice of Appeal, any Notice of CrossAppeal, and additional documents that were requested.
I further certify:
1.

That no exhibits were marked for identification or

admitted into evidence during the course of this action.
2.

That the following will be submitted as an exhibit to

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE

this record on appeal:
Transcript of Proceedings filed April 9, 2008
IN WITNESS WHEREOF I have hereunto set my hand and affixed
the seal of said court this

/

day of December 2008.

PATTY 0. WEEKS, Clerk

Deputy Clerk

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE

THE STATE OF IDAHO,

)

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

)
)
)
)
)
)

)
)
)
)
)

DAVID M. ESTES,

Defendant-Appellant

SUPREME COURT NO. 35767
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

)

I, DeAnna P. Grimm, Deputy Clerk of the District Court of
the Second Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for
the County of Nez Perce, do hereby certify that copies of the
Clerk's Recora were placed in the United States mail and
addressed to Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General, P. 0
Box 83720. Boise. Idaho 83720-0010 and David M. Estes. 1308 loth
Avenue, Lewiston, ID

83501 this

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

day of

m7

2688.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed

/3

the seal of the said Court this

day of

PATTY 0. WEEKS
CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT

,....
!,

BY

.,

Deputy Clerk

2

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

;03
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